A failure in the fishing hydraulics system likely triggered an engine room fire that forced the crew to abandon their trawler 118 miles offshore in the Gulf of Maine last summer, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reported Thursday.
The captain noticed a burning smell and saw thick, black smoke flowing out from the engine room exhaust fan in the port stack and engine room door.
After broadcasting a distress call on the marine VHF radio, the captain with crew of four and National Marine Fisheries Service observer got off in the raft, with the observer’s personal locator beacon (PLB) and the Three Girls’ emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) both activated.
The Coast Guard District 1 command center received alerts from both devices shortly after 9 p.m. Just before 10 p.m. a fixed wind surveillance aircraft and a search and rescue helicopter were launched from Air Station Cape Cod, Mass.
As the aircraft approached the captain deployed rocket flares to mark the raft’s position. The fishing vessel Princess Laura arrived on scene, but the Three Girls captain determined that rising wind and waves made it too dangerous for his crew to trying boarding from the raft.
At 10:43 p.m. the Coast Guard cutter William Chadwick arrived on scene and launched a rescue boat with four crewmembers. The fishermen crew of boarded the rescue boat and were transferred to the cutter without injury.
“The cutter began transiting back “to Portland about midnight, and the rescued crewmembers recalled they could see the Three Girls continuing to burn in the distance,” the NTSB report notes.
A tugboat was dispatched to recover the Three Girls and tow it back to Portland Aug. 14, where NTSB and Coast Guard investigators boarded to examine the damage, estimated at $1.3 million.
During their examination in the engine room, “investigators found several exposed surfaces were heavily covered in soot, and there were a few areas of ‘clean burn’ present between the hydraulic return oil filter housing and the winch engine that had been operating at the time of the fire,” according to the NTSB report.
“This indicated the fire had burned hottest there and that the fire area of origin was likely in the port, forward corner of the engine room between the hydraulic return oil filter housing and the winch engine.”
Investigators found all hydraulic hoses from the hydraulic return oil filter box were detached from their aluminum filter housing covers, “which had been melted away by the fire, indicating the hoses, their fittings, or another component of the box had failed. The cause of the fire was likely the ignition of pressurized hydraulic oil spraying on components of the running winch engine exhaust system,” the investigators concluded.
The NTSB offered its customary “lessons learned” epilogue to the report.
“After an engine room fire ignites, it is imperative to remove the sources of available fuel and ventilation to the fire to prevent it from spreading,” the report said. “Vessel designers, builders, owners, and operators are encouraged to install, regularly test, and have emergency drills that incorporate remote shut offs for all machinery within these spaces to ensure the machinery can be remotely stopped from outside the space where it is situated.”
“Additionally, to prevent the reintroduction of oxygen to the space, vessel designers and owners should ensure that the ventilation, both natural and forced draft, can be completely and remotely secured to all engine rooms."
